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Abstract
THE IMPACT OF MOOD DISORDERS ON COGNITIVE FUNCTION IN POSTMENOPAUSAL WOMEN UNDERGOING TREATMENT FOR EARLY-STAGE
BREAST CANCER

by
Margery E. Frosch

Adviser: Professor Arietta Slade
PURPOSE: Many post-menopausal women who are treated for early-stage breast cancer
report experiencing cognitive difficulties following adjuvant chemotherapy. However, the
generalizability of the results of a number of studies that have attempted to document the
association between adjuvant chemotherapy and cognitive dysfunction has been limited due to
inconsistencies in the investigative methods used, thus introducing the possibility that other
factors are contributing to reports of cognitive problems. The current study examines the
possibility that a history of mood disorders in post-menopausal breast cancer patients predisposes
them to cognitive difficulties following adjuvant treatment. METHODS: Sixty-five
postmenopausal women with non-metastatic breast cancer were administered the SCID-I before
adjuvant therapy (Time 1) to determine psychiatric status. Thirty women were found to have a
history of mood disorder, while thirty-one women were found to have no history of mood
disorder. Participants were administered neuropsychological tests before adjuvant therapy (Time
1), six months after treatment (Time 2), and at a final six-month follow-up (Time 3). Cognitive
domains measured included motor, language, attention/concentration/working memory,
visuospatial, memory (verbal and visual). RESULTS: Group comparisons found significant
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differences in several domains at Time 1 (attention) and Time 2 (visual spatial and visual
memory), but in each case the mood disorder group means were higher than the group means of
the non-mood disorder group. No significant results were found at Time 3. CONCLUSION: In
postmenopausal women, a history of mood disorder was associated with higher performance in
selected cognitive domains. Reasons for these paradoxical results are explored and suggestions
for future research are proposed.
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Mood Disorders and Cognitive Function 1
The Impact of Mood Disorders on Cognitive Dysfunction in Post-Menopausal Women
Undergoing Treatment for Early-Stage Breast Cancer
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Many women who are treated for early-stage breast cancer report cognitive
difficulties following adjuvant chemotherapy (Ahles et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2006;
Brezden, Phillips, Abdollel, & Tannock, 2000; Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et al.,
1998; Wieneke & Dienst, 1995). The researchers who first investigated this phenomenon
used standard neuropsychological tests to assess post-treatment performance in this
population in a number of cognitive domains and found that breast cancer participants
who had chemotherapy treatment scored significantly lower on the cognitive measures
compared to breast cancer participants who did not have chemoptherapy treatment (Ahles
et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2006; Brezden et al., 2000; Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et
al., 1998; Wieneke & Dienst, 1995). The investigators inferred that these differences
could be attributed to chemotherapy treatment.
However, there were significant limitations to the design of these initial studies.
First, the researchers assessed the subject’s cognitive functioning following
chemotherapy treatment, thus forcing them to compare subject performance to that of
population norms or control groups, rather than to baseline measures of the subject’s own
pre-treatment cognitive functioning. Further, the participants were assessed at a variety
of times post-treatment (Ahles et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2006; Brezden et al., 2000;
Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et al., 1998; Wieneke & Dienst, 1995), meaning there was
no uniformity to the time points studied, adding the confound that time post-treatment
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might also be a factor in cognitive performance. Finally, the researchers did not separate
participants by menopausal status, introducing an additional confound as estrogen has
been found in some studies (Aveleyra, Carranza-Lira, & Ulloa-Aguirre, 2005; Bagger,
Tanko, Alexandersen, Qin, & Christiansen, 2005) to protect cognitive functioning.
The breast cancer research community recognized the importance of these
discoveries in spite of the limitations of the investigations that yielded them, and was
careful to base the next generation of research on longitudinal studies that included a
measure of cognitive functioning prior to the advent of chemotherapy treatment, thus
establishing a baseline measure for comparison (Stewart et al., 2008; Jenkins et al.,
2006).

They also adopted more uniform criteria regarding what constituted impaired

cognitive functioning in a within-participants research design. However, variations
remained in the menopausal status of subject groups and the in the lengths of time
participants were assessed following chemotherapy.
In spite of continued differences in assessment design, two constants emerged
from the second generation of research. First, a large number of women in the studies –
up to 35% in one study (Wefel et al., 2004) – were found to be cognitively impaired prior
to undergoing chemotherapy treatment, a finding that called into question the conclusions
regarding impaired cognitive performance following chemotherapy treatment made by
the first generation of research. Second, while the prospective studies did uncover
evidence of change in cognitive functioning following chemotherapy, the associations
were weak and did not follow a consistent pattern (Jansen, Miaskowski, Dodd, Dowling,
& Kramer, 2005).
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Recently, breast cancer researchers turned to brain imaging studies in a continuing
attempt to uncover physical evidence that will definitively link chemotherapy treatment
to cognitive dysfunction. Using a variety of techniques (Ganguli, 2006; Hull, 2002),
investigators have examined the brains of breast cancer survivors who have had
chemotherapy and report finding differences in the size and volume of certain brain
structures and regions compared to those of population norms. However, the imaging
studies suffer from some of the same limitations as the first generation cognitive studies:
an absence of baseline images to use as a basis for comparison, a lack of uniformity in the
times following chemotherapy when images are made, and a lack of control over age and
menopausal status of participants. Further, there is no consistency in the questions being
asked by the imaging researchers – some examine the sizes of a subject’s hippocampus
looking for explanations for memory loss, while others look at blood flow in cortical
regions in an attempt to account for problems with executive functioning.
This leaves us with an interesting problem. Breast cancer survivors continue to
report problems with memory, attention, concentration, and motor function and a
significant number of them are experiencing cognitive dysfunction. However, the
hypotheses underlying the research into this phenomenon to date – that chemotherapy
treatment is somehow responsible for their experience of cognitive dysfunction – has yet
to be convincingly demonstrated by the chosen methods of assessment.
Therefore, it is time to examine this phenomenon from a different perspective. As
noted above, a significant number of breast cancer survivors are reporting cognitive
problems following treatment; however, it is possible that the women who are reporting
cognitive problems are in some way different from those who are not. Perhaps the
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women who report experiencing cognitive problems are more vulnerable to disruption
than their peers and perhaps this vulnerability is a psychological one.
The question asked by the present research is the following: is the presence of a
pre-existing mood disorder, which will be defined here as depression, anxiety, or a
combination of depression and anxiety – predictive of significant cognitive changes in
post-menopausal women being treated for early-stage breast cancer? In other words,
does a pre-existing mood disorder predispose a breast cancer patient to cognitive
difficulties following chemotherapy treatment?
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CHAPTER TWO
The Mind-Body Relationship
The Mind-Body Relationship and the Origins of Psychology and Psychoanalysis
Modern psychology was introduced to the world in the late 1880s by Jean-Martin
Charcot, a neurologist whose observations of and experiments with the so-called
“hysterics” at the Salpetriere asylum in Paris clearly demonstrated the mind’s power to
disrupt the brain’s normative functioning. Charcot attracted the attention of the curious
in the nascent world of neurology by using hypnosis and suggestion at his famous
“Tuesday lessons” (Goetz, Bonduelle, & Gelfand, 1995) to administer seemingly
miraculous cures to the mysteriously afflicted participants in his care. One of the curious
was Sigmund Freud, who is known to have attended Charcot’s demonstrations for a five
month period between 1884 and 1885 (Goetz et al., 1995).
Upon his return from France, Freud introduced what he had learned from
Charcot to his partner Joseph Breuer and the two began to use hypnosis and suggestion
with their hysterical participants, eventually documenting the theory and method behind
this new treatment (Freud & Breuer, 2004). Using evidence gathered from individual
cases, Freud and Breuer challenged the current belief that hysteria was solely a physical
illness, arguing instead that it was a psychic disorder, in which the emotion associated
with distressing experiences and memories, rather than being expressed through normal
channels, was somehow removed from consciousness and expressed through physical
symptoms. Freud made his famously prophetic statement that “hysterics suffer mainly
from reminiscences” (Freud & Breuer, 2004) following his and Breuer’s successes with a
series of participants, including the infamous Anna O., thus grounding the etiology of
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psychopathology in the individual’s reactions to and subsequent repression of distressing
real-life experiences.
Freud’s early use of the “the talking cure” (Freud & Breuer, 2004) was rooted in
his belief in the power of experiential “reminiscences” to influence and distort an
individual’s current thought, beliefs, and behavior which were then manifested as
hysteria or other emotional problems. He focused on uncovering his participants’
disguised, disavowed, or repressed memories, delving into their pasts and attempting to
free them from the secrets that were crippling them, literally and figuratively. In the
course of these investigations, many of Freud’s participants reported experiencing
emotional, physical, and sexual abuse at the hands of family members, often their
parents, when they were children. The overwhelming amount of data he collected that
contained these disturbing details led Freud to propose that the origins of hysteria and all
other neuroses lay in “infantile sexual abuse” (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Freud formally
presented these findings in “The Aetiology of Hysteria” in 1896. Legend has it that the
idea of widespread pedophilia and other abuses so scandalized the upper-classes of
Victorian Vienna that Freud was forced to back away from his “seduction theory”
(Freud, 1896) and propose instead that his participants’ memories were based in part on
fantasy and wish.
Regardless of what actually happened, one outcome of the uproar is clear. Freud
abandoned his belief in the pathognomic power of actual experience and retreated to the
one-mind world of intrapsychic drives and fantasy and, for the most part, took
psychology and psychoanalysis with him.
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The Return to Repression of the “Real"
In the decades following Freud’s disavowal of the centrality of real-life
experiences in the etiology of neuroses and other psychological problems, psychoanalytic
theory focused almost exclusively on conflicts between the components of Freud’s
structural model – the id, ego, and superego – and the drives, unconscious wishes, and
fantasies fueling these conflicts (Mitchell & Black, 1995). However, World War I and
the trench warfare that characterized this struggle reignited interest in the role those
environmental forces, particularly traumatic ones, played in formation of psychological
problems. The disorder that came to be known as “shell shock,” characterized by
symptoms now associated with posttraumatic stress disorder, was experienced by
thousands of soldiers who during battle lay helplessly trapped in trenches and foxholes as
bombs and mortar shells rained down on them with devastating impact. Not only were
these soldiers terrified and shaken by the unrelenting noise of explosions, they were
helpless to act as their comrades were often blown to pieces next to them. The screams
of the injured, left waiting for rescue and treatment that could not be provided until a
particular fusillade had ceased, completed the traumatogenic picture (Rivers, 1918).
W.H. Rivers, a British psychiatrist, observed numerous cases of shell shock while
posted at Craiglockhart War Hospital from 1915 to 1917. Through his work with
traumatized soldiers, Rivers came to believe that although the conditions the soldiers had
survived at the front were horrible, it was actually their “repression” of these horrific
experiences that led to the devastating symptoms of shell shock. Rivers believed that “It
is not repression in itself which is harmful, but repression under conditions in which it
fails to adapt the individual to his environment” (Rivers, 1918). Acting against the
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conventional wisdom of the time which encouraged soldiers to use any means possible to
forget their war experiences, Rivers encouraged his participants to stop struggling against
the memories and to let them become “tolerable, if not ever pleasant, companions instead
of evil influences which forced themselves upon his mind” (Rivers, 1918). Like Freud
before him, Rivers treated the repression of the memory and not the memory itself as the
villain:

…When in place of running away from these unpleasant thoughts he faced them
boldly and allowed his mind to dwell on them in the day they no longer raced
through his thoughts at night and disturbed his sleep by terrifying dreams of
warfare… (Rivers, 1918)
Object relations theory developed in Great Britain in the early 1940s against the
back drop of the horror and devastation of two world wars that had unfolded and been
fought in her front yard. This new approach to psychoanalysis was grounded in the belief
that individuals were primarily “object-seeking” (Fairbairn, 1946) and, therefore, that
psychopathology stemmed from disturbances in each person’s primary caregiving
relationships. This assumption represented a radical break from the Freudian emphasis on
the intrapsychic world of pleasure-seeking, drive and fantasy that had defined
psychoanalysis since Freud’s abandonment of the seduction theory in 1896. The
vulnerability of the human psyche to environmental and relational forces became the
focus of a large part of the psychoanalytic world, re-introducing Freud’s long-abandoned
idea that the etiology of psychopathology was shaped at least in part by traumatic
experiences with external objects and the environment.
The return to theories recognizing the impact of the extra-psychic world and
emphasizing relationships with others as the driving forces of development made room
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for psychologists to give voice to ideas concerning the connection between the mind and
body and the impact of trauma, abuse and neglect, and how the unexpressed, repressed,
or dissociated emotions associated with these disturbing experiences might instead be
disguised through their expression in, by, or through the body.
One of the first psychoanalysts to return to ideas about the mind-body connection
and the consequences of disruption on this system was D.W. Winnicott. In “Mind and Its
Relation to the Psyche-Soma” (Winnicott, 1954), Winnicott presents his theory, based on
clinical observation, that the infant does not initially experience any differentiation
between mind and body – in her world the “psyche” represents the experience of physical
and emotional vitality. The child’s mind develops when her “good enough mother” fails
to perfectly meet her needs and create a perfectly responsive environment. These
tolerable failures facilitate the child’s capacity to recognize the existence of two different,
yet interactive spheres of existence – what goes on inside her (needs, feelings, etc.) and
the outside world that usually responds to her needs. The mother’s normative failures
foster the development of the mind which, in turn, leads to the child’s awareness of a
separation between self and object, and an understanding that the child’s needs and
feelings are her own and reside within her. The mother becomes recognizably separate
and reliable. Less-than-good-enough circumstances interfere with the child’s capacity to
differentiate between self and other, creating a situation where the child will struggle to
recognize herself as the source of her affects (vs. the environment or others) and feel like
an independent center of initiative who has a sense of agency in the world. Perhaps the
most important point that Winnicott makes in this article is that the child’s development,
optimal or otherwise, occurs in a relational context and that the consequences of a
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disruption in the child’s mind-body relationship has significant consequences for the
course of her emotional development.
Winnicott continues this line of thought in “Psycho-Somatic Illness in its Positive
and Negative Aspects” (Winnicott, 1966). Here, Winnicott discusses psycho-somatic
illness as “the dissociation in the patient which, as an organized defence, keeps separate
the somatic dysfunction and the conflict in the psyche.” Winnicott is clearly stating that
the dissociation between mind and body occurs specifically to protect the individual from
what she believes will be the catastrophic impact of integrating the scattered aspects –
physical and emotional – of memory. Winnicott appears to be echoing Freud’s belief,
stated so many years before, that individuals who dis-integrate do so to preserve the
integrity of the self from the potentially destabilizing power of memories.
Concurrent with Winnicott’s later musings on the vicissitudes of psychosomatic
illness was the development of the idea of alexythymia, a term coined by Sifneos
(Sifneos, 1967)), but most extensively explored by Henry Krystal, a psychologist who
started his career working with Holocaust survivors. According to Krystal (Krystal,
1979, 1983, 1997, 1998), alexithymia is a cluster of symptoms found in a number of
psychiatric and psychological illnesses, including psychosomatic illness, substance abuse
problems, and trauma, in which there is a disconnect between the cognitive, physical, and
emotional aspects of experience. Alexithymic individuals do not recognize their feelings;
they are unable to tell whether they are angry, sad, hungry, or excited. They experience
physical symptoms associated with these feeling states, but do not recognize their
emotional experiences as the source of these sensations so they cannot utilize their
feelings as signals regarding the state of the self. Because of this disconnect, alexithymic
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individuals have no emotional vocabulary; they are unable to use language to describe
their states of being. As a result, their emotional lives are barren and they often lack the
ability to fantasize or project themselves into the future.
Krystal found that alienation from affect leads to two distinct methods of coping:
addictive behavior or psychosomatic illness. Each strategy works by further isolating the
individual from her internal states, but through different mechanisms. Substance abuse
effectively smothers the uncomfortably uninterpretable sensations while somatization
concretizes the affect into a physical sensation or symptom. Both tactics protect the
individual from the disorganizing and potentially overwhelming power of what she
experiences as mysterious, outside forces (Krystal, 1979).
Like Winnicott before him, Krystal located the source of alexithymic disturbance
in the disruption in the mother-infant dyad, particularly in the mother’s ability to carry
out the critically important function of teaching affect differentiation to her child:

It is a major part of upbringing to instruct the child about what he/she feels and
what should be done in a given situation. In this fashion, the parent demonstrates
to the child that the more precise the identification of the affect, the more
effective its use as a signal to one’s self and the better a tool in the “art of living.”
Thus enabling a child to recognize and tolerate shame is an important
achievement. But if, instead of just recognizing shame, the child is enabled to
recognize seven or more shadings and nuances of that affect…the child gains a
chance to become familiar and develop tolerance of these affects. Otherwise,
these are often deeply buried in the core of an “abscess” around which addiction
or psychosomatic disease may develop… (Krystal, 1997).
It is the mother’s (or the primary caregiver’s) failure to teach the child the meanings and
functions of emotion that leads to the alexithymic individual’s crippling alienation from
her affects.
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Krystal’s work continues to build on the body of theoretical evidence that
establishes a significant connection between the mind and the body and to describe how
the mind – symbolized by strong affect – can disrupt optimal bodily and cognitive
functioning (psychosomatic illness, addiction) under certain sets of circumstances.
However, Krystal’s work also adds the cognitive component to the mindbody/psychosomatic connection through his assertion that an optimal understanding of
and ability to utilize emotion as a guide must be learned in a relational context and that
language develops in this context to facilitate the emotional learning process.

From Mind to Body: The Relationship Between Stress,
Mood Disorders, and Cognitive Function
Over the years, researchers have collected an enormous amount of data that
demonstrates the negative impact of strong emotion, stress, and the individual’s struggle
to manage these circumstances on the efficient functioning of the brain and endocrine
system and, thus on cognitive function ((Bale, 2005, 2006; Sapolsky, 2003b; McEwan &
Sapolsky, 1995; Ohman, Bergdahl, Nyberg, & Nilsson, 2007). There is evidence that the
hormones involved in the body’s stress response alter the plasticity of the cells in the
brain’s limbic system leading to the consolidation of neural pathways that keep the body
in a continuous state of alert, regardless of environmental cues (Sapolsky, 2003a; Garcia,
2001). Further, the chronically elevated levels of these potent chemicals that are
associated with states of hyper-arousal appear to damage the neurons in these brain areas,
preventing synapse growth and interfering with certain types of learning and memory
consolidation (Sapolsky, 2003a; Heflinger & Newcomer, 2001; Garcia, 2001).
Over the years, Michael Eysenck and his colleagues have investigated the impact
of anxiety on cognitive functioning and have proposed and updated several theories they
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believe explain the connection between the two (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo,
2007; Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The first of these,
processing efficiency theory (PET) (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), claims that efficient
cognitive functioning has two distinct components: “performance effectiveness,” or the
quality of performance and “processing efficiency,” which measures the quantity of effort
required to reach a certain level of performance. Based on this premise, they suggest that
anxiety globally impacts cognition in two distinct and seemingly opposed, ways. First,
they believe that anxiety interferes with working memory function by reducing its storage
and processing capacities. However, they also posit that anxiety has a motivating effect
when it comes to “activities designed to improve performance.” In 2005, Eysenck
(Eysenck et al., 2005) explored whether anxiety impaired specific cognitive domains – in
this case visuospatial processing and working memory. His findings echoed the
assumptions of PET as well as those of additional studies (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998)
that anxiety appears to impact the functioning of the domain-free “central executive” of
the cognitive system rather than specific cognitive domains.
In 2007, Eysenck and colleagues introduced attentional control theory (ACT), an
updated and expanded version of PET based on developments in cognitive research in the
fifteen years that had passed since he and Calvo proposed the original theory. PET and
ACT are united by the assumption that “anxiety disrupts the efficient functioning of the
cognitive processing center of the [brain’s] working memory system “(Eysenck et al.,
2007). However, ACT links the efficient functioning of the cognitive executive system
with two previously unnamed components: shifting and inhibition. According to ACT,
anxiety interferes with the cognitive system’s capacity to inhibit irrelevant stimuli,
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resulting in increased distractibility. This is especially true if the external stimuli are
perceived as threatening. Further, anxiety disrupts the cognitive system’s capacity to shift
between tasks. In summary, disruptions in shifting and inhibition increase the impact of
the “stimulus-driven attentional system” on cognition, resulting in increased attention to
external factors at the expense of concentration.
Wood, Mathews, & Dalgleish (2001) investigated the impact of anxiety on
cognitive function by exploring whether a predisposition to anxiety is associated with
impairment in the capacity to inhibit data and/ or stimuli that are irrelevant to current
tasks or situations. They define inhibition as “an active process whereby unwanted
interference from irrelevant information can be prevented, whether consciously or
nonconsciously” (Wood, Mathews, & Dalgleish, 2001) and suggest that that individuals
who suffer from anxiety and struggle to inhibit irrelevant stimuli under normal
circumstances will have even more difficulty focusing on relevant data under stressful
circumstances. Thus, anxiety causes one to be more easily distracted and more likely to
demonstrate a preferential focus on certain kinds of stimuli, leaving fewer resources
available for focus on other, more situationally relevant factors.
Airaksinen, Larsson, and Forsell (2005) looked at the impact of anxiety on
cognitive function by investigating whether people diagnosed with an anxiety disorder
(panic disorder, social phobia, and others) show neuropsychological impairments relative
to healthy controls in tasks tapping episodic memory, verbal fluency, psychomotor speed,
and executive functioning. Compared to normal controls, the anxious group demonstrated
significant impairments in episodic memory, commonly understood as the memory for
events and the times, places, emotions, and concept-based knowledge associated with
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those events, as well as in executive functioning. There were no between group
differences in the verbal and motor domains. Anxiety appears to interfere with encoding
and storage of information, rather than with retrieval of stored material, and this, in turn,
is associated with problems with divided attention capacity, something we refer to in the
twenty-first century as multi-tasking.
Thus, anxiety appears to disrupt the aspects of cognition that are involved in
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant information and, in turn, these inhibitory
deficits interfere with efficient encoding and storage of data. In other words, anxiety
leaves one vulnerable to distraction and being distracted makes it difficult to focus on
one, let alone many concurrent cognitive demands.
Unipolar depression has also been linked to disruptions in cognitive function.
Airaksinen et. al (2004) used the Trail-Making Test (Reitan, 1958), a measure that
assesses working memory (Trails A) and cognitive flexibility (Trails B), to investigate
the impact of depression on cognitive functioning and found that episodic memory and
cognitive flexibility were significantly impaired in the depression group. They also
found that type of impairment is associated with depression type: major depression and
anxious-depression are related to impairments in memory while dysthymia is linked to
difficulties with cognitive flexibility and mental set shifting. According to these results,
depression, like anxiety, appears to disrupt the encoding and storage processes of
memory, but not retrieval mechanisms.
Depression has also been linked specifically to working memory dysfunction and
problems of executive functioning (Miller, 1975; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995;
Ilsley, Moffoot, & O'Carroll, 1995), but, until recently, the specific components of
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memory that are affected had not yet been determined. Current research has been based
on a model of working memory first proposed and subsequently built on by Baddeley and
colleagues (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, Lewis, & Vallar, 1984; Baddeley, 1996;
Baddeley & Wilson, 2002) envisions memory as a system composed of a central
executive, and two subordinate, or slave, systems: the visuospatial sketch pad, and the
phonological loop. The central executive coordinates the components of memory, but is
also responsible for “fractionating,” or allotting it to additional processes, like prioritizing
activities and overseeing the sharing of cognitive resources to permit multitasking. The
visuospatial sketch pad is where visual and spatial information is processed and the
phonological loop is responsible for managing auditory information. Both slave systems
have limited capacities.
Using Baddeley’s system as the foundation for their research, Christopher &
MacDonald (2005) compared the performance of three subject groups – depressed,
anxious, and normal controls – on memory tasks that assessed the functioning of the
central executive and its two slave systems. They found significant between-groups
differences on five of the seven tasks, with the depression group scoring significantly
lower than the other two groups on three of those five tasks. On the remaining two tasks
the depression and anxiety groups performed similarly, but both were significantly
different from normal controls. Their data revealed cognitive deficits in depressed
participants on tasks involving all three components of Baddeley’s memory system, not
just on the central executive as had been previously reported (Channon, Baker, &
Robertson, 1993). They conclude that their findings support attentional focus theories
(Eysenck et al., 2007)) which posit that emotionally stressful conditions disrupt cognition
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because a portion of cognitive resources are allocated to the intrusive thoughts and other
conditions of the mood disorder.
In sum, both anxiety and depression appear to be associated with cognitive
dysfunction, though each works through different mechanisms, and impacts different
domains.
Psychodynamic/Psychoanalytic views on the relationship between
emotional stress and psychopathology
Over the past two decades, psychologists and psychiatrists interested in bridging
the gap between the subjective worlds of their participants and the physiological systems
that give rise to these phenomena have found strong evidence that stress interferes with
both emotional and cognitive functioning. The groundbreaking work of Bessel van der
Kolk and others into the etiology, phenomenology, psychology, and psychobiology of
PTSD, provides further, and perhaps even stronger, evidence of the powerfully negative
impact that emotional and physical stress have on cognitive functioning (van der Kolk,
1999, 2001, 2002; van der Kolk, Greenberg, Boyd, & Krystal, 1985; van der Kolk et al.,
1996 ; van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & Spinazzola, 2005). They have begun to
look at how stressors like chronic emotional abuse and neglect and physical and
emotional trauma lead to stressful physical states in the individual and how the chemistry
of stress may be involved in the disruption of cognitive functioning and the establishment
of neural pathways that are related to the persistent patterns of thought and perception
seen in psychopathology. This mind-brain research is relevant to the “chemo brain”
phenomenon because the symptom clusters associated with PTSD include depression,
anxiety, and cognitive disruption, further elucidating the impact of stress on the human
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organism and strengthening the case that overwhelming emotional experiences disrupt
cognitive functioning, particularly in the area of memory.
A related area of research involves the idea of mentalization, a cognitive concept
that refers to the individual’s capacity to “make sense of the actions of oneself and others
on the basis of intentional mental states, such as desires, feelings, and beliefs…”
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). The ability to mentalize effectively is seen as an acquired
skill that is fostered in childhood by adequately attuned parenting. Under stressful
developmental circumstances, however, like those involving chronic devaluation, neglect,
emotional and/or physical abuse, the child does not acquire the capacity to mentalize.
Without this critically important skill, the child is unable to differentiate between her
internal environment and the external world, resulting in a sense of unboundedness and
diffusion of self. Further, subjective states are experienced as completely separate from
external realities, as well as from other aspects of the individual’s mental life, resulting in
a discontinuous, encapsulated experience of self. This kind of continuous emotional
stress keeps the individual in a constant state of arousal that compromises executive
functioning, learning and memory.
The Impact of a Breast Cancer Diagnosis on Emotional Functioning
Receiving a breast cancer diagnosis, entering the unfamiliar world of treatment,
and joining the community of cancer survivors are life-changing, helplessness-inducing,
and perception-altering experiences (McKenzie & Crouch, 2004). A woman often
receives her diagnosis, undergoes surgery, and begins adjuvant treatment in the course of
two months or less, a time-table that has the potential to throw her world into disarray.
The seriousness of the diagnosis demands quick action, leaving little time for extended
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contemplation of or planning for the impact these events will have on a woman and her
family. Life-and-death decisions often have to be made in relatively short amounts of
time (Compas & Luecken, 2002).
Women with breast cancer have been shown to have elevated levels of stress
hormones in their blood (Aardal & Holm, 1995), though it is not known whether this is
due to the cancer itself, the stress associated with receiving a diagnosis of and having
treatment for breast cancer, or both. Regardless of the direction of that relationship, it is
clear that women with breast cancer experience stress and that this stress might be the
source of treatment-related cognitive problems.
Breast Cancer and Stress
Confrontation with a life-threatening illness was not added to the list of PTSD A1
criteria until the publication of the DSM-IV (A.P.A., 2000). Since then, a number of
studies have explored whether or not significant numbers of breast cancer survivors
suffer from PTSD. Though these studies vary widely in sample size and type, age of
participants, time post-treatment, and type of instruments used, their results show that
many breast cancer survivors experience intense helplessness and horror at diagnosis,
intrusive thoughts, avoidance behaviors, and co-morbid mood disorders without suffering
from full-blown PTSD.
A group from North Shore University Hospital – Cornell Medical Center was the
first to systematically study the prevalence of PTSD in female cancer survivors (Alter et
al., 1996) as part of the DSM-IV field trials for PTSD. They compared a small,
demographically heterogeneous group of female cancer survivors (n=27) who were at
least three years past the termination of treatment with a community-based sample
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matched for age and socioeconomic status.. Participants’ emotional states were assessed
by a battery of self-report measures. They found that cancer survivors had a higher
prevalence of PTSD (22%) than their community-based counterparts (0%) and that the
symptoms experienced by the cancer group were similar to symptoms experienced by
survivors of events traditionally associated with PTSD like combat experience, rape,
violent assault, and life-threatening accidents. Though their study results seem to
suggest that facing a life-threatening illness bore inclusion as an A criterion in the DSMIV diagnosis of PTSD, the authors also cautioned that their sample size was small and
that longitudinal studies with larger samples were needed for more conclusive results.
Cordova and colleagues (Cordova et al., 1995) studied a group of 55 early-stage
(Stage 1 to Stage 3A) breast cancer survivors who were between six months and five
years past active treatment (chemotherapy and/or radiation). They assessed each
subject’s overall quality of life and prevalence of PTSD-like symptoms using a series of
self-report measures that are strongly correlated with the DSM-IV. Between 5% and
10% of the women in their sample suffered from symptoms that would warrant a DSMIV diagnosis of PTSD. However, they also cautioned that because their participants were
many months post treatment, acute PTSD-like symptoms associated with initial breast
cancer diagnosis and treatment might not have been captured by their study design
(Cordova et al., 1995). In addition, they cited the cross-sectional design of their study, as
well as the small number of participants as cautions against generalizablity. Like Alter
and colleagues (Alter et al., 1996), however, these researchers found evidence pointing to
the potentially traumatic nature of facing a life threatening illness like breast cancer.

Mood Disorders and Cognitive Function 21
Baider and Kaplan De-Nour investigated the presence of PTSD-like symptoms in
a relatively large sample (n=238) of Israeli women who had been diagnosed with Stage I
and Stage II breast cancer in earlier studies (Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997). They
focused on the “intrusive thoughts” criterion of the DSM-IV diagnosis and found a strong
correlation between intrusion and psychological distress; intrusion was found to account
for 30% of the variance in the psychological distress of participants. In their analysis,
Baider and Kaplan DeNour suggest that “intrusive thoughts may be more sensitive
indices of cognitive/affective and physiological responses to the stress associated with
cancer diagnosis and treatment than are measures of generalized psychological distress”
(Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997). Based on these results, they suggest that breast
cancer participants, while not necessarily suffering from DSM-IV defined PTSD, do
share a “cognitive style” (Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997) with PTSD sufferers.
However, the generalizability of these results is limited by the specific circumstances of
the sample: 13% of participants were Holocaust survivors, while 49% were recent
immigrants from the former Soviet Union. These extreme circumstances may be
combining with cancer diagnosis to produce symptoms that are more serious than the
norm seen in participants whose only serious life-time stressor is cancer.
Green and colleagues (Green et al., 1998) examined the prevalence of PTSD in
166 women with early-stage breast cancer (Stage I or Stage II with no lymph-node
involvement) who were between four and twelve months post treatment. Participants
were assessed through a combination of self-report questionnaires and investigatoradministered structured clinical interviews. This method revealed PTSD rates in the
sample of 3% to 5%, depending on the stringency of assessment criteria employed.
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These numbers are considerably lower than the similar numbers reported by Alter (Alter
et al., 1996) and (Cordova et al., 1995), a disparity that the authors attribute to the latter
studies’ reliance on self-report measures, which, they claim, “tend to overestimate
diagnoses as there is not the opportunity for an interviewer to assess the severity and/or
clinical significance of a particular symptom or to determine whether symptoms arose or
only worsened following the cancer” (Green et al., 1998). However, Green and
colleagues differentiated between the experiences of the older and younger women in
their sample and found that younger women are more prone to cancer-related PTSD
symptoms. Further, they echoed other study results that find a number of PTSD-like
symptoms in breast cancer survivors, but a low incidence of full-blown PTSD. Finally,
they questioned the fit of PTSD to breast cancer diagnosis and treatment as breast cancer
treatment can continue for months and that different stages of the treatment may be
characterized by different levels of distress.
Palmer’s 2004 study (Palmer, Kagel, Coyne, & DeMichele, 2004) of 115 breast
cancer participants echoed the results of prior studies, finding that although the
prevalence of full-blown PTSD in this population was low (4%), the percentage of
women who responded positively to the DSM-IV A2 criterion (responding to the cancer
event with intense fear, helplessness, or horror) was a relatively high 41%.
Pitman and colleagues examined the psychophysiological responses of 37 early
stage (Stage I to Stage III) breast cancer participants by administering a structured
clinical interview regarding PTSD and exposing them to recordings of their own cancer
“scripts” and measuring a number of physiological responses including heart rate, skin
conductance, and electromyogram (Pitman et al., 2001). Though the number of
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participants with a current PTSD diagnosis in the sample was small (n=5), their
physiological reactions were positively correlated with their interview responses and
elevated to the same level as those of participants whose PTSD results from other types
of traumatic events. The authors assert that this relationship provides “psychophysiologic
support for the proposition that being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness, in this
case breast cancer can be a stressor sufficient to result in PTSD” (Pitman et al., 2001).
An investigation of morning blood cortisol levels by Luecken (Luecken, Dausch,
Gulla, Hong, & Compas, 2004) adds additional physical evidence for the presence of
PTSD-like symptoms in newly diagnosed (within six months of study participation)
breast cancer participants. Seventy-one women with early-stage breast cancer (Stage I to
Stage III) were screened for past and/or current PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder
(MDD) with structured, investigator-administered, clinical interviews and self-report
measures. PTSD due to breast cancer diagnosis was found in 3% of the sample and past
MDD was found in 25% of the sample. Comorbidity of PTSD and MDD was high: 39%
of participants with past MDD had past or current PTSD; 54% of women with past or
current PTSD had past MDD. Blood analysis revealed significantly lower levels of
morning cortisol in participants with past or current PTSD compared with controls.
Overall, morning cortisol levels were negatively correlated with number of PTSD
symptoms endorsed. Cortisol levels were also significantly lower in participants with
MDD compared with controls, but the correlation between number of MDD symptoms
endorsed and cortisol levels was not found. Women suffering from current PTSD who
also had a history of MDD had the lowest cortisol levels of all groups compared to
controls. These results, combined with those of Oquendo (Oquendo et al., 2003),
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“suggest neuroendocrine alterations associated with PTSD and MDD in women newly
diagnosed with breast cancer” (Luecken et al., 2004) – alterations that have the potential
to disrupt cognitive and emotional functioning.
Summary
There is a strong historical foundation for ideas regarding the mind’s ability to
adversely impact the brain’s normative functioning. Empirical research has convincingly
linked stress to changes in brain chemistry and in neuronal pathways in ways that impact
optimal functioning and are implicated in the development of mood disorders. Mood
disorders are associated with cognitive difficulties and a breast cancer diagnosis has been
associated with the development of mood disorders. In fact some studies have found that
up to 46% of breast cancer survivors suffer from depression (Van't Spijker, Trijsburg, &
Duivenvoorden, 1997). This evidence strongly supports the possibility that the cognitive
problems seen in breast cancer participants are related to the extreme emotional stress
inherent in the experience of being diagnosed with and treated for cancer with adjuvant
chemotherapy.
Thus, the basic premise of the current research is that the cognitive difficulties
observed among women being treated with adjuvant chemotherapy for early stage breast
cancer are related to the psychological stress of a treatment experience that includes
chemotherapy, but not to chemotherapy alone. Following this line of thought, it is then
reasonable to believe that women who enter the breast cancer treatment experience with
pre-existing psychological difficulties are more likely to be cognitively impaired than
their unaffected peers. These ideas are operationalized in the following ways:
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Hypothesis 1: Participants who have any lifetime or current diagnosis of a mood disorder
at the baseline evaluation will score lower on a battery of cognitive tests than participants
who do not have any lifetime or current diagnosis of a mood disorder at the baseline
evaluation.

Hypothesis 2: More participants who are cognitively impaired as defined by this study
will report clinically significant levels of anxiety and/or depression than participants who
are not cognitively impaired.

Independent Variables:
1. Any lifetime or current diagnosis of a mood disorder at the baseline evaluation.
2. Global cognitive impairment as defined by this study.
Dependent Variables:
1. Cognitive domain scores at all three study time points (baseline, six months
following baseline, six months following second evaluation) as measured by the
study’s battery of neuropsychological tests
2. Clinically significant levels of self-reported anxiety, self-reported depression or
both.
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CHAPTER THREE
Methods
The data used in the current research was collected in the context of an earlier
study whose focus was to investigate the impact of adjuvant chemotherapy on the
cognitive functioning of post-menopausal, early-stage breast cancer participants. (Tager
et al., in press). The current study explored the impact of the breast cancer experience on
cognition, but focused on the effect of pre-cancer psychiatric status on cognitive domains
rather than on chemotherapy status.
Sample
Participants were women who had been diagnosed with early-stage breast cancer
(ductal carcinoma in situ, Stage I, Stage II, or Stage IIIa), had no evidence of metastatic
disease, and underwent curative breast surgery, either a breast conserving procedure or
mastectomy with or without breast reconstruction.
Participants were recruited through collaboration with the breast surgeons and
oncologists affiliated with the Columbia University Medical Center/New York
Presbyterian Hospital. The doctors supplied the names of women who expressed interest
in participating in the study or in learning more about it to members of the research team
who then contacted and screened the potential participants for eligibility.
Participants
Seventy-four post-menopausal women between the ages of 45 and 70 were
initially enrolled in the study. Of the 74 participants who signed informed consent to
participate in the study, three were determined to be ineligible to participate prior to the
T1 testing; and an additional six were not administered a SCID at T1; leaving a study

Mood Disorders and Cognitive Function 27
sample of 65 participants. (For demographics of the study sample see Table 1.) Further
attrition during the study resulted in a Time 2 sample size of 59 participants and a Time 3
sample size of 53 participants.
Participant recruitment
Recruitment was conducted through the breast surgeons who made the definitive
diagnosis of breast cancer in potential participants. The study was advertised to
participants with IRB-approved fliers posted in the waiting and exam rooms of the
Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center breast surgeons’ practices. The fliers invited any
woman interested in learning about the study to call the study coordinator or to give her
contact information to her surgeon’s office staff, who would then contact a member of
the study team. In addition to fliers, a member of the study team was in contact with the
all of the breast surgeons’ support staff weekly to ascertain whether any woman who
came in for an appointment was eligible for the study. A member of the study team was
also available in surgeons’ waiting rooms to speak with anyone who was interested in the
study and, if appropriate, to obtain informed consent. If a woman indicated interest in
participating, a member of the study team met with her, reviewed the study, and
completed an eligibility screen. The appointment for the first evaluation was made for a
time following surgery and before the advent of chemotherapy treatment.
Participant selection criteria
The study’s inclusion criteria for participation were the following:

1. Participants had to be women between the ages of 45 and 70. The upper age
limit of 70 years was chosen because of significant decrements exist in the
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normative scores between people aged 60-69 versus 70-79 on several of the
neuropsychological tests that were used in this study.
2. Participants had to be postmenopausal – defined for the study’s purposes as
not having had a menstrual period for at least twelve months prior to their
diagnosis and treatment.
3. Participants had to have had an early-stage breast cancer diagnosis (up to
Stage III, no metastatic disease), surgery to remove the cancer (lumpectomy
or mastectomy with sentinel lymph node removal if necessary), and
undergone a course of adjuvant treatment (chemotherapy, radiation, hormonal
therapy, or all three).
4. Participants could not be receiving hormone replacement treatment at the time
of assessment.
5. Participants could not have a prior history of breast cancer or other cancer
treatment.
6. Participants could not have a pre-morbid history of health problems or serious
psychiatric illness. Participants could not be on a long-term course of
psychotropic medication to address anxiety, depression, or any other serious
psychiatric condition.
7. Participants had to have minimal reading and speaking fluency in English (to
at least a 5th Grade level) The requirement of English fluency was a necessary
constraint because many of the measures used have not yet been translated
into other languages, or normed and validated in non-English speaking
populations.
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Procedure
Eligible participants were evaluated after surgery, but prior to the onset of any
adjuvant treatment (baseline/Time 1) allowing the study to determine participants’ preadjuvant-cancer-treatment, baseline psychiatric status as well as their baseline levels of
cognitive functioning – the independent and dependent variables, respectively. Informed
consent and a HIPAA-compliant consent were obtained at the beginning the first
evaluation session. Participants were assessed for the second time between four to six
months after the initial evaluation (Time 2) and for the third and final time approximately
six months after the second assessment (Time 3). The timing of the second assessment
was dependent on whether or not the subject had undergone chemotherapy treatment.
Testing and interviews were conducted at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,
in offices in the Department of Psychiatry/Behavioral Medicine or Medical Oncology, or
if necessary at the subject’s home or office. All testing was done by trained testers
Baseline/Time 1 Assessment:
Participants were contacted by phone approximately one week after surgery to
schedule their first visit. The first evaluation included all of neuropsychological tests
previously listed, and all self-report forms. This evaluation required approximately 1.5-2
hours. Following the evaluation, the subject was contacted by another member of the
study team to schedule and/or administer the SCID-I.
Approximately 3 months following the first visit participants were contacted by
phone for a brief follow-up conversation and reminder about the study. This contact was
intended to sustain the subject’s connection to the study in order to maximize retention in
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the study through the final assessment.
Time 2 and Time 3 Assessments:
Approximately 6 months after the first visit participants were contacted to
schedule their second evaluation. For participants who received chemotherapy, this
second assessment occurred within one month following the completion of chemotherapy
treatment. The second visit included all neuropsychological tests, and all self-report
forms, the same assessment as Time 1. Again scheduling and administration of the
SCID-I took place following the assessment. Approximately 6 months following the
second evaluation, participants were contacted to schedule the third and final assessment.
The final visit included all neuropsychological tests, and all self-report forms, the same
assessment as Time 2. Again scheduling and administration of the SCID-I took place
following the assessment.
Participant payment and follow-up
Participants received $50 for each of the three assessments. A check was mailed
to each subject approximately 2-3 weeks after each assessment.
Approximately 1 month after the second assessment, participants received a
written report summarizing the results of their first two evaluations. If any subject
exhibited significant cognitive deficits, change in cognitive function, or significant
psychological distress, she was contacted to discuss these findings and was offered a list
of referrals.
Approximately one month following the final assessment, participants received a
written report summarizing the results of all three evaluations. Again, she was contacted
to discuss these findings and was offered a list of referrals.
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Measures
Psychological measures: psychiatric and psychological status
The primary independent study variable was presence of any lifetime or current
diagnosis of a mood disorder at baseline. The method used to determine the presence or
absence depression and anxiety in participants was the Structured Clinical Interview for
the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002), which
provides a diagnosis of lifetime and current psychiatric disorders according to standard
diagnostic criteria. This interview has been widely validated for use in both research and
clinical practice. It is a more sensitive, objective measure of psychological status than
self-report measures. Only the SCID-I Mood and Anxiety modules were administered in
order to limit the focus to depression and anxiety disorders and to minimize the length of
the interview. The SCID-I was administered by a trained interviewer and took
approximately 20-40 minutes.
In addition, affective distress was assessed with two self-administered/self-report
measures. The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI) (Beck, Rial, & Rickels, 1974),
(Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988) includes twenty-one items that assess depressive
symptoms. The BDI assesses a general syndrome of depression and has been wellvalidated against clinician ratings (Beck et al., 1988). It has been widely used in various
medical populations. The Zung Self-rating Anxiety Scale (ZAS) (Zung, 1971b), (Zung,
1971a) is a twenty-item measure assessing general anxiety symptoms. The ZAS is
sensitive to clinical changes and has been used in conjunction with depression measures
to differentiate between depression and anxiety (Zung, Magruder-Habib, Velez, & Alling,
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1990).
Estimating pre-morbid intelligence
Intelligence is typically measured as an IQ score gleaned from the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS III). Administering the entire WAIS III is very time
consuming; therefore, general intellectual functioning was estimated utilizing an average
of the North American Adult Reading Test (NAART) and a demographic intelligence
estimate (Barona, Reynolds, & Chastain, 1984). The two estimates together provide a
better estimate of general intellectual functioning than either one alone (Willshire,
Kinsella, & Prior, 1991). This method of estimating intelligence is a widely accepted
proxy for administering a full-scale IQ measure. The remaining battery of tests is listed
below.
Neuropsychological measures.
The neuropsychological tests utilized for this study assess the cognitive domains
of attention/concentration, language, memory, visuospatial skills, and motor speed.
These particular areas of cognitive functioning appear to be most vulnerable in this
population based on the small body of research that has investigated effects of
chemotherapy on women with breast cancer. The specific tests used to measure
performance in each of these broad categories are described below.
1. Attention/Concentration/Working Memory:
Attention and concentration as well as working memory refer to an individual’s
ability to take in and process information in a timely fashion. Attention can be divided
into different forms such as sustained attention, an individual’s ability to focus on and
process information for an extended period of time, or divided attention, an individual’s
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ability to focus on more than one thing at a time. Problems with attention can be
manifest in either the visual and/or the verbal domain. Thus, multiple tests of attention,
measuring different aspects of attention were utilized in this study.
The Trailmaking Test (Reitan, 1958) is a pencil and paper test of speed for visual
search, attention, mental flexibility, and motor function that is sensitive to cognitive
dysfunction. The test takes approximately 4 minutes to administer.
The Digit Span test is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III
(Wechsler, 1997) that is part of the Working Memory Index. It is a test of working
memory and mental manipulation of information. Individuals are asked to repeat back
numbers of increasing length, first forward and then backward. The test takes
approximately 6 minutes to administer.
The Digit Symbol test is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III
(Wechsler, 1997) that is part of the Processing Speed Index. It is a pencil and paper test
of speed of processing. The test takes approximately 3 minutes to administer.
Arithmetic is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (Wechsler,
1997) that is part of the Working Memory Index. It is a mental arithmetic test
incorporating processing of verbal information and mental manipulation of that same
information. The test takes approximately 7-8 minutes to administer.
This Number/Letter test is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III
(Wechsler, 1997) that is part of the Working Memory Index. It is a more complex test of
working memory and mental manipulation involving both numbers and letters. The test
takes approximately 5-6 minutes to administer.
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2. Language
The Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (Benton, Hamsher, &
Sivan, 1983) is a standardized, valid and reliable test of verbal fluency. The subject is
asked to generate words after being given a phonemic cue, in this case, a letter of the
alphabet. This test takes approximately 4 minutes to administer.
The Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weinstraub, 1983) is a
standardized, valid and reliable measure of word-finding abilities. Participants must
name objects from pictures. This test takes approximately 10 minutes to administer.
3. Memory
The Buschke Selective Reminding Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974) is a standardized,
valid, and reliable measure of verbal memory through a list learning procedure.
Participants are asked to recall a list of 12 words over six trials. This test takes
approximately 10 minutes to administer.
The Benton Visual Retention Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974) is a standardized,
valid, and reliable measure of visual perception and visual memory. Participants are
asked to draw from memory geographic shapes of increasing complexity. This test takes
approximately 6 minutes to administer.
4. Visuospatial
The Rey Complex Figure Test – Copy (Meyers & Meyers, 1995) is a test of
visuospatial constructional ability. Participants are asked to copy a complex geometric
design. This test takes approximately 3-4 minutes to administer.
5. Motor
The Grooved Pegboard (Klove, 1963); (Matthews & Klove, 1964) is a
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standardized, valid, and widely used measure of manual dexterity that requires complex
visual-motor coordination. This test takes approximately 3-4 minutes to administer.
The Finger Tapper (Halstead, 1947) is a standardized, valid, and widely used test
of manual dexterity and fine motor speed. This test takes approximately 3 minutes to
administer.
Participant Ratings
Participants were administered the SCID-I at Time 1 to determine if they met
DSM-IV criteria for mood disorder. Participants who met criteria for any lifetime or
current mood disorder diagnosis at Time 1 were rated “DXy”, while the participants did
not meet criteria for any lifetime or current mood disorder diagnosis at baseline were
rated “DXn.” Of the 65 participants who were administered a Time 1 SCID-I, 30, or
46%, were rated DXy while the remaining 35 participants, or 54%, were rated DXn.
Participants completed two self-report measures, the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI) and the Zung Anxiety Index (ZAI), at each evaluation to further assess
psychological status. For the purposes of this study, participants were rated depressed
(DEPy) if they reported clinically significant levels of depression (BDI score > 10) and
not depressed (DEPn) if they did not (BDI score < 10). Similarly, participants were rated
anxious (ANXy) if they reported clinically significant levels of anxiety (ZAI score >45)
and not anxious (ANXn) if they did not (ZAI score < 45).
Participants were considered “impaired” (IMPy) if they met the following criteria:
1) scoring more than one standard deviation below the norm for age and education level
on two or more of the neuropsychological tests; or 2) scoring more than two standard
deviations below the norm for age and education level on one test. They were
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considered not impaired (IMPn) if they did not meet these criteria.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Results
Analyses performed & Results
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 17.0. Cognitive test raw scores were
converted to z-scores based on standard norms to allow for comparison of means. To
compare subject characteristics, independent sample t-tests were used for continuous
measures and Chi-square tests for categorical measures.
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1 posited that participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder
at Time 1 would score lower on the battery of cognitive tests at Times 1, 2, and 3. The ttests revealed a significant difference in performance between diagnosed participants and
undiagnosed participants at Time 1 in the domain of attention (p=0.03) and a borderline
significant difference (p=0.06) in the domain of verbal memory (Table 2). Contrary to
the hypothesis, however, the participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder
scored higher than the undiagnosed participants, indicating that the presence of a premorbid mood disorder is associated with better performance in the domains of attention
and verbal memory. A breakdown of performance by individual neuropsychological test
yielded similar results: the participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder scored
higher than the undiagnosed participants (Table 5).
The t-tests revealed a significant difference in performance at Time 2 in the visual
spatial domain (p=0.04) and in the domain of visual memory (p=0.01) (Table 3). Once
again, however, the results are contrary to the study hypothesis as the participants who
were diagnosed with a mood disorder scored higher than the undiagnosed participants,
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indicating that the presence of a pre-morbid mood disorder is associated with better
performance in the visual spatial domain and the domain of visual memory. A breakdown
of performance by individual neuropsychological test yielded similar results: the
participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder scored higher than the
undiagnosed participants (Table 6).
The t-test did not uncover any significant differences in performance at Time 3 by
domain (Table 4), but did uncover one significant difference in performance on the
Buschke Long-Term Retrieval of words index (Table 7),
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that more participants who are cognitively impaired as
defined by this study would report clinically significant levels of anxiety and/or
depression than participants who are not cognitively impaired.
Chi-square analysis examining combinations of cognitive impairment status, selfreported depression status, and self-reported anxiety status detected a significant
relationship between impairment status and self-report of depression (Table 8, X2=0.034),
but, once again in opposite direction of what was proposed in the hypothesis. At Time 1,
more participants who were not cognitively impaired reported clinically significant
feelings of depression than participants who were cognitively impaired. No significant
results were detected at Time 2 or Time 3 (Table 9, Table 10).
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion
Summary of Results
The results of the t-tests performed on the current research indicate that a mood
disorder diagnosis is not associated with comparatively lower performance in certain
cognitive domains as was predicted by Hypothesis 1. In keeping with this paradoxical
result, the chi-square analysis performed to test Hypothesis 2 revealed that fewer of the
cognitively impaired participants reported clinically significant levels of anxiety and
depression than the unimpaired participants. In other words, the participants who reported
feeling significantly depressed or anxious were not in the cognitively impaired group.
This study’s finding that mood disorders are associated with better performance in
certain cognitive domains contradicts the literature cited earlier that consistently links
depression and anxiety to cognitive dysfunction. Anxiety is associated with disruptions
in the brain’s capacity to filter out distracting stimuli, leading to global and domainindependent interference in cognitive functioning (Eysenck et al., 2007; Airaksinen,
Larsson, & Forsell, 2005; Eysenck et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2001; Derakshan & Eysenck,
1998; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Depression is also linked with disruptions in storage and
encoding of memory, as well as with disruptions in executive functioning (Airaksinen,
Larsson, Lundberg, & Forsell, 2004; Baddeley & Wilson, 2002; Baddeley, 1996; Burt et
al., 1995; Ilsley et al., 1995; Baddeley et al., 1984; Miller, 1975; Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). So to what can we attribute results indicating that depression and anxiety are
associated with better cognitive performance and that there is a negative relationship
between cognitive impairment and self-report of anxiety and depression in this research?
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First, the results of the current research must be examined and understood in the
context of the study for which the data was originally collected – an investigation into the
existence of chemobrain (Tager et al., in press) or “cancer-related cognitive dysfunction”
(Clegg, 2009) a constellation of symptoms including memory loss, problem organizing
one’s thoughts, and a general “fogginess” in thinking reported by breast cancer
participants who have gone through chemotherapy. A number of studies (AndersonHanley, Sherman, Riggs, Agocha, & Compas, 2003) suggest that adjuvant chemotherapy
for early-stage breast cancer is associated with cognitive impairment related to attention,
memory, and visuospatial functioning, but inconsistencies in study designs, measures,
and sample characteristics call into question the generalizability of those results.
Regardless of these structural imperfections, prior research suggests that it is the impact
of chemotherapy drugs on the physical well-being of breast cancer participants that is the
source of “chemobrain.” However, there is considerable debate within the chemobrain
research community concerning the pathways through which chemotherapy disrupts
cognition and, as a result, investigations have not approached the question from a
consistent perspective nor have they employed consistent research designs. Crosssectional designs have been used, but they lack baseline data for comparison (Ahles et al.,
2002; Brezden et al., 2000; Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et al., 1998; Wieneke &
Dienst, 1995). Investigations comparing the impact of different chemotherapy drugs and
combinations have been done (Jansen et al., 2005; Tangpong, Cole, & Sultana, 2007),
but, again, they lack the consistency necessary to establish a reliable pattern of impact.
Brain imaging studies have identified patterns of change in brain structure in participants
who have undergone chemotherapy, but to date, none of the imaging studies have
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baseline images to use for comparison (Ferguson, McDonald, Saykin, & Ahles, 2007).
Each of these studies has yielded significant results which support the existence of
“chemobrain,” but because of considerable differences in approach, and, in some cases, a
lack of pre-cancer data to use for comparison, their generalizability is limited and,
therefore, no clear picture of the cause and/or effect of chemobrain has yet been drawn.
The Tager and McKinley study, upon which the current research is based, was
intended to improve upon some of the limitations of prior chemobrain research by
employing a longitudinal study design that collected pre-chemotherapy, baseline data,
thus providing a means for within subject comparisons where participants act as their
own controls, making changes in performance easier to detect and building in controls for
conflating variables. In spite of the improved design, significant study findings were
minimal: time by treatment interaction was significant in the Motor domain (p=.007) with
poorer performance in women treated with chemotherapy; for the other domains,
however, scores did not significantly vary over time by group. Thus, the Tager and
McKinley study (in press) concluded that in postmenopausal women, chemotherapy was
not associated with changes in cognitive function in the areas reported by breast cancer
survivors: attention, memory, and information processing. In addition, the result
indicating significant disruption in motor skills in women treated with chemotherapy
could be secondary to peripheral neuropathy rather than an indication of more general
declines in cognitive processing.
The current research took the Tager and McKinley (in press) study’s findings into
account and removed chemotherapy, as well as any surgical or cancer-diagnosis-related
physical problems from the equation. Instead, the current research focused solely on pre-
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existing psychiatric and psychological conditions as the primary contributing factors to
the complaints of cognitive disruption reported by breast cancer chemotherapy survivors.
A considerable literature exists to link anxiety, depression and other psychiatric
conditions to cognitive disruption, so the current research was built on a solid foundation.
Contrary to the literature, however, this approach did not uncover a link between
psychiatric diagnoses and impaired cognitive functioning. So we return, once again, to
the question at hand: what factors might have contributed to these unexpected findings?
One place to look is at the sample used in the current study to determine if there
was anything about this particular group of participants that might have contributed to the
results found in the current research. At baseline, 34% of the sample was found to be
cognitively impaired prior to chemotherapy treatment according to the standards of
impairment defined for this study -- a figure that is considerably higher than the 19% rate
of mild cognitive impairment found in US adults below the age of 75 (Lopez et al.,
2003).
It is possible, then, that the cognitive problems reported by breast cancer
participants who receive chemotherapy begin before treatment and that what participants
experience as chemobrain is related to the experience of receiving a breast cancer
diagnosis and undergoing surgery and/or is part of the organic process of cancer. Using
this scenario, it is possible that cognitive disruptions start before treatment and that
chemotherapy alone is not a factor in “chemobrain.” It is also possible that because such
a large percentage of the sample was already impaired prior to treatment that any impact
of chemotherapy was undetectable. There may already be too much going on in the
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cognitive domains due to diagnosis and/or disease process to tease out the impact of
chemotherapy, if there even is an impact of chemotherapy.
There are other sample characteristics that bear examination (See Table 1). The
sample that participated in this study -- though a relatively homogeneous group compared
to the general population -- was quite diverse ethnically, compared to studies that
followed a similar design and yielded similar results (Jenkins et al., 2006). The
composition was as follows: 67.2% white, 14.8% African-American, 8.2 % Hispanic, and
10% Asian. Additionally, the sample as a group was of above average estimated
intelligence (mean estimated IQ = 112.7) and averaged more years of education (16.3
years). It is possible that there is something about these characteristics that masked any
significant impairment or allowed the participants to compensate for any difficulties in
unidentified ways. This idea is supported by the fact that the nine women who withdrew
from the study without completing the Time 2 evaluation had significantly fewer years of
education and significantly lower IQ as a group. These women also showed significantly
poorer performance at baseline in language, motor skills, attention, and verbal memory.
It is possible, then, that if the sample been more diverse in terms of education and IQ, the
overall results might have been different. What remains unclear, however, is whether
that hypothetical difference would have been due to chemotherapy or education and IQ.
In addition, a majority of the nine women who withdrew from the study had had a
mastectomy and were scheduled to receive chemotherapy. Chemotherapy is associated
with higher disease stage and mastectomy is often a traumatic experience for women as it
greatly impacts feelings about body image (Cimprich, Ronis, & Martinez-Ramos, 2002).
Both of these factors have the potential to raise levels of psychological stress, so it is
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possible that if these participants had remained in the study, significant indicators of
cognitive impairment would have been detected.
Limitations of the Present Study
The current research was limited by a problem inherent to many studies: using
data collected in the service of one set of hypotheses to investigate another set of related,
but significantly different questions. The data that forms the basis of the current study
was gathered to explore the impact of chemotherapy on the cognitive functioning of postmenopausal women undergoing adjuvant treatment for early stage breast cancer. The
investigators gathered data on the psychological states of the participants and how issues
like depression, anxiety, and fatigue might individually impact cognition or interact to
impact cognition, but questions of mood and psychiatric diagnosis were not central to the
research question. The measures used in the original research are well-tested and
reliable (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006); and valid within the context of that original
study, but it is probable that they are not the ideal tools for assessing the questions posed
by this study.
As the literature cited earlier confirms, emotional states, particularly anxiety and
depression, are strongly linked with cognitive disruption. Where the problem lies, I
believe, is in the presumption that DSM-IV-defined psychiatric diagnosis would capture
breast cancer-specific emotional experience. While they are in the same ballpark, they
are not the same phenomena. The SCID, used here to determine psychiatric diagnosis,
the independent variable in this study, is an excellent diagnostic tool, but for the purposes
of this study that is also where its weakness lies. So many variables combine to create
the breast cancer survivor’s overall experiences, not to mention the fact that each stage of

Mood Disorders and Cognitive Function 45
treatment has distinct emotional challenges, that a construct as stable and specific as a
DSM-IV diagnosis may not be the best measure to capture the components of the breast
cancer experience that might contribute to the chemobrain phenomenon. Breast cancer
diagnosis and treatment have the potential to raise a multitude of concerns regarding
sexuality, body image, femininity, fertility, and mortality, all of which, singly or in
combination, are enough to disrupt a woman’s normative emotional state and, by
extension, her normative cognitive functioning. Some experiences may be acute, others
may develop over time, and all appear to be strongly impacted by individual differences.
Women are clearly experiencing symptoms associated with trauma, but not in the
consistent or stable patterns that the SCID attempts to identify.
The lack of significant results in this study may also be attributed to the tests that
were employed to measure cognitive functioning. Evidence links anxiety and depression
to disruptions in executive function and the storage and encoding of memory, but the
tests used in this study do not measure these domains specifically enough to catch these
disruptions. Three of the tests employed by this study to evaluate working memory are
subtests of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). However, the primary focus of Digit Span,
Arithmetic, and Number/Letter is assessing the subject’s ability to mentally manipulate
verbal and numerical information, not her ability to store and/or encode that information
– the aspects of memory that are reportedly most disrupted by mood symptoms. Two
additional memory tasks, the Buschke Selective Reminding Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974)
and the Benton Visual Retention Test (Sivan, 1992), also assess retrieval of verbal and
visual information, but not storage or encoding of those types of information.
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Emotionally stressful conditions have been linked to disruptions in executive
functioning – the brain’s ability to coordinate memory, attention, and motor skills to
create a coherent experience of and set of reactions to outside stimuli – because the
intrusive thoughts and distractions characteristic of mood disorders demand a portion of
cognitive resources that would otherwise be dedicated to normative brain function (Wood
et al., 2001). Thus, one would expect that the participants in the study diagnosed with
mood disorders would score lower on tasks that assess executive function than their peers
without mood disorder diagnoses. Tasks that measure executive functioning assess
divided or alternating attention, novel organization of concepts or information, as well as
concentration.
It is possible that the tasks used in the present research to evaluate executive
functioning are not sensitive enough to assess it adequately. The Controlled Oral Word
Association Test (COWAT) (Benton et al., 1983), which engages executive functioning
through its demand for novel organization and production of information in response to a
specific cue, is primarily a measure of verbal fluency. Attention and concentration, other
crucial components of executive function, were also assessed in this study by the Rey
Complex Figure Test (Meyers & Meyers, 1995), but the Rey is primarily a task of
visuospatial organizational ability. The Trailmaking Test (Reitan, 1958) is perhaps the
best measure of executive functioning used in this research as it demands coordination
between visual search, attention, mental flexibility, and motor functioning. However, no
significant differences were found between the participants with mood disorder diagnoses
and their undiagnosed peers on any of these tasks.
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The SCID, BDI, and Zung are all well-known and reliable measures of psychiatric
diagnosis, depression, and anxiety but the questions they ask may not adequately capture
the complex and multilayered psychological experience of women struggling with breast
cancer, and this undetected and so-far unquantified experience may be what most
interferes with cognitive function. Literature cited earlier in this document suggests that
while anxiety and depression are certainly part of the breast cancer survivor’s experience,
intrusive thoughts, a primary symptom of PTSD, are equally prominent. The SCID does
ask questions about PTSD symptoms, but only in the context of diagnosing the disorder,
which requires consistent report of multiple symptoms over a specific amount of time.
Thus, it is possible that the SCID, despite its reliability, is not a valid measure of the
constellation of emotional and physical experiences of women with breast cancer.
Similarly, the Beck and the Zung may not capture the particular experiences of altered
mood associated with the breast cancer experience.
There is also evidence that younger women struggling with breast cancer have a
more complex and emotionally disruptive experience of illness and treatment (Baucom,
Porter, Kirby, Grenmore, & Keefe, 2006; Epping-Jordan et al., 1999; Northouse &
Swain, 1987) and most studies have not separated women into post- and pre-menopausal
categories. Thus, it is possible that results supporting the presence of chemobrain in
other studies were due to the presence of younger women in the studies, reflecting their
particular age-related difficulties. The current study featured postmenopausal
participants only, possibly removing a source of variance that characterized other studies,
and possibly revealing something unique about the cancer-related experiences of postmenopausal women. Perhaps post-menopausal participants are more emotionally stable
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as a group compared to pre-menopausal women due to their age and age-related factors.
Post-menopausal women are less likely to have young children in the home, are more
likely to have finished initial educational pursuits, and are more likely to be more solidly
established in jobs, careers, and family. Thus, there are fewer external complications.
Perhaps, due to their age, postmenopausal participants are more emotionally stable than
younger participants in general, leading to less breast-cancer treatment-related disruption
than anticipated. Maybe this study’s hypotheses were more attuned to the cancer-related
cognitive experiences of younger women and did not adequately capture the seemingly
less emotionally complex experience of post-menopausal women.
Another explanation may come from a recent brain-imaging study that examined
brain activity in identical twin sisters, one of whom had been treated for early-stage
breast cancer while the other had not been through any cancer diagnosis or treatment
(Ferguson et al., 2007). The sisters were administered an identical battery of cognitive
tests and MRI scans. The twins’ performance on the cognitive testing was statistically
the same, but the cancer survivor had significantly more complaints about her cognitive
functioning. Interestingly, the MRI scans provided possible empirical support for her
struggles, revealing more activity in her brain than in her twin’s, suggesting that she was
working harder to achieve comparable scores on the same tasks as her sister. The “case
study” nature of this work, the fact that the investigators have no earlier MRIs of the
participants to use for comparison, and other design questions limit the generalizability of
these results, but this work does pose interesting questions about women’s experience of
chemobrain and the mixed empirical results that appear to simultaneously confirm and
deny its existence. Perhaps chemobrain is simply the cancer survivor’s real experience of
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having to work harder, to literally use more brain power to maintain her pre-cancer
diagnosis and treatment baseline of cognitive functioning. Maybe studies have revealed
only minimal or mixed evidence in support of chemobrain despite patient report because
of the brain’s remarkable capacity to compensate for injury and stress by re-routing
impulses or combining different nets of neurons to maintain pre-morbid functioning.
This could account for the phenomenology of chemobrain as well as for the lack of
consistent evidence for cognitive dysfunction. Women experience their brains working
harder and due to this cognitive compensation, the deficits being compensated for are
remediated before they show up on cognitive tests.
It is also possible that there was something about the testing situation employed in
the current research that impacted subject performance. In the majority of cases, the
same testers met with the same participants three times and spoke with them on the phone
several times to collect data during the course of the study. The context in which these
contacts took place – cancer diagnosis, surgery, and chemotherapy treatment – was
emotionally laden and, by report of subject and tester, added a personal dimension to the
testing situation that may have influenced subject performance for the better. Further,
study participants reported thinking about tasks between testing sessions and looking
forward to testing sessions as “an hour and a half when I won’t be thinking about having
cancer or how sick my next treatment will make me feel.” Thus, it is possible that the
presence of the study in subject’s lives and the opportunity for mastery and positive
challenge it presented affected performance for the better and obscured any significant
cognitive impact chemotherapy treatment might have had.
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Clinical Implications
The current research does not make a particularly significant contribution to the
chemobrain literature per se, but it does, I believe, provide an opportunity to stop and ask
a number of questions about this very real phenomenon and how it is currently studied. It
is clear at this point that an association between chemotherapy and cognitive problems
exists (Clegg, 2009; Anderson-Hanley et al., 2003), but the answer to what it is about
chemotherapy that is causing these problems remains elusive. I doubt that a single cause
will ever be identified. Thus, I believe it is time to broaden the scope of the chemobrain
investigation to include improvements in the treatment experience and interventions for
remediating the condition. I also feel strongly that the benchmarks of success at this
juncture should be based on self-report of quality of life and sense of efficacy, rather than
on performance on neuropsychological tests as the empirical research does not appear to
be capturing the experiences cancer participants describe. There are tests that measure
effort which might evidence differences if the thesis of the twin study is correct. Whether
chemobrain is physical, psychological, or a combination of both, giving participants the
tools to manage their experience will provide a sense of empowerment that is critically
important to healing.
As a clinical psychologist, I believe that knowledge is the key to empowerment,
so I would include information about cancer-related cognitive problems in the
discussions participants have with their oncology team prior to the start of chemotherapy
treatment. I understand the worry that mentioning chemobrain will result in participants
reporting that they have it – a self-fulfilling prophecy if you will – but just as not all
participants experience all the possible side effects of treatment, not all participants will
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experience cognitive disruption. Including cancer-related cognitive disruption as a
possible side effect will make it a legitimate part of the treatment experience for women,
give them permission to talk about it with their medical teams, and, perhaps most
important, empower them to ask for help managing and remediating symptoms. If
chemobrain information is included in a patient’s preparation for treatment, women will
have a vocabulary for discussing their experiences from the beginning of treatment and
be in a better position to make use of their medical teams as sources of information and
support.
I also believe it would help participants if there was a clinical psychologist
available to or formally part of every oncology practice. Clinical psychologists are
trained to assess participants for changes in mood, provide emotional support and
behavioral interventions, and to administer psychological and neuropsychological tests;
thus, they are in a unique position to be of assistance to an oncology practice, managing
the emotional aspects of treatment while leaving the medical professionals to focus on the
medicine. A psychologist could also be of assistance during medical appointments by
providing an additional, more objective set of ears, by taking notes and keeping track of
medications, and by being available to help participants and their caregivers manage the
emotionally challenging aspects of talking about cancer treatment.
The best first step towards designing effective chemobrain interventions would be
to speak at length with women who have been through treatment – perhaps using a focus
group format -- and to use their experience to develop a uniform set of questions about
treatment course, physical symptoms and side effects, emotional reactions to treatment,
struggles to maintain relationships and careers, and other relevant information to create a
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comprehensive picture of chemobrain. Researchers could then use this information to
develop treatments that survivors could use to remediate any problems that might have
developed during treatment, including helping them regain their sense of agency and
competency, one of the most significant losses of the chemobrain experience. The
efficacy of these interventions would be based on self-report of well-being, not on
performance on tests because empirical methods do not appear to capture the experience
of chemobrain very well.
Participants have taken advantage of many effective, traditional treatments to
work through and manage their treatment-related experiences including survivorship
programs (cancercare.org, americancancersociety.org), and individual and group
psychotherapy (Boutin, 2007). However, I believe that there are new avenues of
remediation to explore that individually or in combination with more established methods
of treatment will help women regain their sense of agency and overall cognitive
competency. There has been an explosion in research about the potential benefits of
cognitive training and remediation, leading to a growing consumer market for games and
puzzles designed for adults to use on their PDAs and home computers many of which are
focused on brain exercise, memory boost (Nintendo DS, lumosity.com) It would be
interesting to engage these companies in chemobrain intervention research, perhaps
arranging trials where some participants would use the products during treatment to see if
they have any impact on cognitive performance and self-report of mood.
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Directions for Future Research
To date, chemobrain research has employed too many different study designs and
asked too many different questions for the results to present an organized and definitive
picture of the mechanisms or impact of chemotherapy on the cognitive functioning of
cancer survivors. Therefore, to unify the field and to add value to future research, I
believe that it is critically important that chemobrain researchers adopt the guidelines of
the International Cognition and Cancer Task Force that formed in 2003 and convened
again in 2006 in an attempt to establish a set of uniform guidelines for chemobrain
research that will remove the confounds and methodological problems that have limited
the generalizability of results up to this point (Vardy, Wefel, Ahles, Tannock, & Schagen,
2008).
One of the most important aspects of this new research protocol would be an
increased emphasis on including baseline data in all studies. As discussed earlier in this
document, cross-sectional and imaging studies have made important contributions to the
emerging understanding of “chemobrain,” but without baseline data as to use for
comparison, this information has limited generalizability. Longitudinal studies have
gathered post-diagnosis, post-surgical, and pre-chemotherapy data, but it is possible that
the stresses inherent in these circumstances have already impacted the cognitive
functioning of participants. The unexpected 34% baseline impairment rate found in the
Tager and McKinley sample is just one example of a finding that illustrates the need for
pre-morbid, pre-surgery, baseline data. Thus, thinking about new ways to gather prediagnosis, truly baseline information about cognitive functioning is of paramount
importance. Perhaps researchers interested in cancer-related cognitive problems could
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follow the example of the Harvard Nurses’ Health Study and conduct a large-scale
initiative to collect normative data on cognitive functioning through primary care
physicians or gynecologists. This data collection might be more complex due to the time
commitment involved in administering a battery of neuropsychological tests, but it could
be presented as an additional dimension of health maintenance and prevention, as well as
a contribution to future medical research, particularly as cancer survivorship continues to
increase.
Research cited earlier in this document also shows that pre-menopausal women
who receive treatment for early stage breast cancer are having different experiences of
diagnosis, treatment, and survivorship based on a combination of physiological and
environmental factors than their post-menopausal peers. Pre-menopausal women who
experience early menopause as a result of chemotherapy may confront distressing
physical symptoms due to decreases in reproductive hormones (Epping-Jordan et al.,
1999) in addition to managing the significant side effects of chemotherapy. It has been
well-documented that the advent of menopause has a considerable emotional impact on
women as it raises questions about femininity, fertility, sexuality, and a multitude of other
health- and identity-related issues. This impact may be significantly magnified in premenopausal women, whose fertility is compromised at the same time that they have
received a cancer diagnosis, raising questions about mortality, survival, and quality of
life. It is possible that these additional physical and emotional disruptions expose premenopausal women to levels of stress that are high enough to influence mood and
cognitive functioning. To date, the Tager and McKinley study is one of the only
chemobrain investigations to focus solely on post-menopausal women and, as has been
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illustrated in this document, the positive findings were minimal at best. It is possible
then, that the evidence of cancer-related cognitive problems found in other studies is due
to the inclusion of pre-menopausal women and the influence of their more-complex
emotional and physical experience. The possibility that these characteristics contribute to
different experiences of cancer diagnosis and treatment, suggests that future studies
should separate participants based on pre-morbid menopausal status.
Another direction for future research would involve looking at cancer-related
cognitive disruption through the lens of trauma. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is
associated with myriad emotional and physical problems, including cognitive dysfunction
(Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997). Few breast cancer participants experience full-blown
PTSD (Cordova et al., 1995), but it is possible that the stressors involved -- a lifethreatening diagnosis, disfiguring surgery, demanding treatment, an uncertain future – are
overwhelming and horrifying enough to result in emotional and cognitive disruptions.
Furthermore, the traumatic events unfold over a protracted period of time – up to a year
in some cases from diagnosis through surgery and treatment – making the cancer and the
ever-present possibility of death a constant stressor. Many cancer survivors (Jennings,
2009) report that the end of active treatment is one of the most emotionally difficult times
to manage because one is no longer doing something about the cancer. Frequent contact
with health care professionals, a source of reassurance and support, abruptly ends at this
point as well, leaving the survivor with the first unscheduled time since diagnosis. In
addition, many a survivor’s support system celebrates “the end,” while the survivor is at
the beginning of having time and space to contemplate and experience what has
happened to her and her family and to think about mortality. It is possible then that we
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are seeing a traumatic syndrome that differs from PTSD in its course, but that is equally
potent in its disruptive power.
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Table 1: Description of participants and comparison of psychiatric diagnosis groups at
Total Sample
DXya
DXnb
(n=65)
(n=30)
(n=35)
Age (yrs)
60.7 (5.9)
59.8 (5.9)
60.6 (5.8)
Estimated IQc
112.7 (8.6)
113.8 (10.7)
111.3 (10.8)
Education (years)
16.3 (3.2)
16.5 (3.4)
16.2 (3.1)
Ethnicity
10.0%
6.9%
8.5%
Asian
14.8%
3.5%
22.8%
Black
8.2%
6.9%
11.4%
Hispanic
67.2%
82.8%
57.1%
White
Chemotherapy
Yes
30 (47.2%)
15 (50%)
15 (42.9%)
No
35 (53.8%)
15 (50%)
20 (57.1%)
Surgery Type
Mastectomy
22 (33.8%)
11 (36.7%)
11 (31.4%)
Lumpectomy
42 (64.6%)
19 (63.3%)
23 (65.7%)
1 (1.5%)
1 (2.9%)
Biopsy only
HRT
33 (50.8%)
14 (46.7%)
19 (54.3%)
Yes
32 (49.2%)
16 (53.3%)
16 (45.7%)
No
Psych Meds @ Time
7 (10.8%)
4 (13.3%)
3 (8.6%)
1
54 (83.1%
24 (80%)
30 (85.7%)
Yes
4 (6.2%)
2 (6.7%)
2 (5.7%)
No
No info
baseline (Time 1)
a

DXy, diagnosed with pre-cancer mood, anxiety, or combined mood-anxiety condition; bDXn, no precancer psychiatric diagnosis; cIQ, intelligence quotient; are shown as either Mean (SD) or Percent% (n).
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Table 2
Means and standard deviations of baseline cognitive domain scores grouped by psychiatric diagnosis status at Time 1

N

DXy Mean (SD) a

N

DXn Mean (SD) a

p-value

65

Group Mean
(SD)a
-0.3368

30

-0.1595

35

-0.4887

0.26

Motor

65

0.2225

30

0.2296

35

0.2164

0.96

Attn

65

0.3671

30

0.5576

35

0.2038

0.03*

Visspa

65

-1.3168

30

-1.0797

35

-1.5200

0.49

Vismem

63

-0.0698

30

0.0217

33

-0.1529

0.56

verbmem

65

-0.3477

30

-0.0937

35

-0.5654

0.06

DOMAIN

N

Lang

a

All values are in z-score units. Z-scores were calculated for each participant’s scores by comparing her performance with standardized, age-corrected norms for
each test.
*
p<0.05
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Table 3
Means and standard deviations of baseline cognitive domain scores grouped by psychiatric diagnosis status at Time 2

N DXy Mean (SD) a

N

DXn Mean (SD) a

p-value

59

Group Mean
(SD)a
0.1103

28

0.2680

31

-0.0321

.32

Motor

59

0.5321

28

0.3863

31

0.6639

.33

Attn

59

0.4151

28

0.5782

31

0.2677

.12

Visspa

59

-1.4468

28

-0.4304

31

-2.3648

.04*

Vismem

59

0.2015

28

0.5329

31

-0.977

.01*

verbmem

59

-0.2544

28

0.0132

31

-0.4961

.09

DOMAIN

N

Lang

a

All values are in z-score units. Z-scores were calculated for each participant’s scores by comparing her performance with standardized, age-corrected norms for
each test.
*
p<0.05
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Table 4
Means and standard deviations of baseline cognitive domain scores grouped by psychiatric diagnosis status at Time 3

DOMAIN

N

Group Mean (SD)a

N

DXy Mean (SD) a

N

DXn Mean (SD) a

p-value

Lang

52

0.1888

27

0.2991

25

0.0698

0.49

Motor

51

0.6274

26

0.4774

25

0.7833

0.28

Attn

52

0.4880

27

0.5711

25

0.3983

0.32

Visspa

51

-0.4708

26

-0.2904

25

-0.6584

0.27

Vismem

51

0.0660

27

0.2354

24

-0.1246

0.24

verbmem

52

0.1304

27

0.3496

25

-0.1064

0.13

a

All values are in z-score units. Z-scores were calculated for each participant’s scores by comparing her performance with standardized, age-corrected norms for
each test.
*
p<0.05
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Table 5
Means and standard deviations of baseline neuropsychological measures, grouped by cognitive domain and psychiatric diagnosis status
at Time 1
N DXy Mean (SD)a

N DXn Mean (SD)a

30

0.2296 (1.35)

35

MOTOR

65

Mean of Group
(SD) a
0.2225 (1.16)

Finger Tapper-Dom Hand

62

1.6682 (1.38)

29

1.6472 (1.23)

33

1.6867 (1.51)

-0.11

0.91

Finger Tapper-Non Dom
Hand
Pegboard- Dom Hand

62

1.2774 (1.22)

29

1.1859 (1.15)

33

1.3579 (1.29)

-0.55

0.58

63

-0.7538 (1.88)

30

-0.5277 (2.00)

33

-0.9594 (1.78)

0.91

0.37

Pegboard- Non Dom Hand

63

-1.1911 (2.07)

30

-0.8313 (1.79)

33

-1.5182 (2.28)

1.32

0.19

LANGUAGE

65

-0.3368 (1.16)

30

-0.1595 (1.20)

35

-0.4887 (1.12)

0.046

0 .26

COWAT

65

0.0157 (0.90)

30

0.0837 (0.88)

35

-0.0426 (0.93)

0.56

0.58

Boston Naming Test

63

-0.6838 (1.93)

30

-0.4027 (2.00)

33

-0.9394 (1.86)

1.10

0.28

ATTENTION

65

0.3671 (0.68)

30

0.5576 (0.52)

35

0.2038 (0.75)

2.17

0.03*

Trail Making A

65

0.5251 (0.92)

30

0.7443 (0.81)

35

0.3371 (0.97)

1.81

0.08

N

t-value

p-value

0.2164 (0.98)

1.138

0.96
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N

N DXy Mean (SD)a

N DXn Mean (SD)a

30

0.7513 (0.68)

35

Trail Making B

65

Mean of Group
(SD) a
0.4271 (1.01)

t-value

p-value

0.1491 (1.16)

2.49

0.02*

WAIS: Digit Symbol

65

0.5995 (1.00)

30

0.7160 (0.90)

35

0.4997 (1.07)

0.87

0.39

WAIS: Digit Span

65

0.1855 (0.92)

30

0.3103 (0.86)

35

0.0786 (0.97)

1.01

0.32

WAIS: Arithmetic

64

0.1673 (0.91)

29

0.4248 (0.79)

35

-0.0460 (0.96)

2.11

0.04*

WAIS: Number/Letter

62

0.2990 (0.90)

29

0.3838 (0.93)

33

0.2245 (0.88)

0.70

0.49

VISUOSPATIAL

65

-1.3168 (2.56)

30

-1.0797 (2.35)

35

-1.5200 (2.74)

0.69

0.49

Rey

65

-1.3168 (2.56)

30

-1.08 (2.35)

35

-1.52 (2.74)

0.70

0.49

VERBAL MEMORY

65

-0.3477 (0.99)

30

-0.0937 (0.95)

35

-0.5654 (0.99)

1.96

0.06

Buschke Total Recall

65

-0.3477 (0.99)

30

-0.0937 (0.95)

35

0.5654 (0.99)

1.96

0.06

Buschke Long Term

65

-0.4103 (1.04)

30

-0.1823 (1.04)

35

-0.6057 (1.00)

1.67

0.10

65

-0.3428 (1.01)

30

-0.1007(0.99)

35

-0.5503 (0.99)

1.82

0.65

Retrieval
Buschke Long Term
Storage
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Buschke Consistent Long

65

-0.5078 (0.99)

30

-0.3703 (0.99)

35

-0.6257 (0.99)

1.04

0.30

VISUAL MEMORY

63

-0.0698 (1.16)

30

0.0217 (1.06)

33

-0.1529 (1.26)

0.59

0.56

Benton Visual Retention:

60

0.1153 (1.07)

27

0.0.0081 (0.79)

33

0.1097 (1.14)

-0.70

0.49

60

-0.3115 (1.26)

27

-0.4467 (0.90)

33

-0.4155 (1.41)

-0.75

0.46

Term Retrieval

# Correct
Benton Visual Retention:
# Errors
a

All values are in z-score units. Z-scores were calculated for each participant’s scores by comparing her performance with standardized, age-corrected norms for

each test.
*

p<0.05
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Table 6
Means and standard deviations of baseline neuropsychological measures, grouped by cognitive domain and psychiatric diagnosis status
at Time 2
N
Mean of Group
N DXy Mean (SD)a N
DXn Mean (SD)a
t-value
p-value
(SD) a
MOTOR
59
0.5321 (1.08) 28
0.3863 (1.08) 31
0.6639 (1.09)
-0.99
0.33
Finger Tapper-Dom Hand

59

1.8097 (1.28)

28

1.5311 (1.33) 31

2.06 (1.19)

-1.62

0.11

Finger Tapper-Non Dom
Hand
Pegboard- Dom Hand

59

1.6059 (1.23)

28

1.3229 (1.09) 31

1.8616 (1.31)

-1.71

0.93

57

-0.5053 (1.60)

28

-0.4529 (1.59) 29

-0.5559 (1.63)

0.24

0.81

Pegboard- Non Dom
Hand
LANGUAGE

57

-0.9140 (1.65)

28

-0.8561 (1.61) 29

-0.9700 (1.72)

0.26

0.80

59

0.1103 (1.16)

28

0.2680 (1.19) 31

-0.0321 (1.13)

0.99

0.32

COWAT

59

0.4381 (1.02)

28

0.4400 (0.90) 31

0.4365 (1.14)

0.13

0.99

Boston Naming Test

59

-0.2175 (1.76)

28

0.0961 (1.91) 31

-0.5006 (1.60)

1.31

0.20

ATTENTION

59

0.4151 (0.76)

28

0.5782 (0.61) 31

0.2677 (0.85)

1.60

0.12

Trail Making A

59

0.5576 (0.98)

28

0.6982 (0.82) 31

0.4306 (1.10)

1.05

0.30

Trail Making B

59

0.3800 (1.17)

28

0.4939 (1.12) 31

0.2771 (1.23)

0.71

0.48
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N

N

DXn Mean (SD)a

t-value

p-value

27

0.4793 (0.82) 30

0.2220 (1.14)

0.97

0.34

N

DXy Mean (SD)a

WAIS: Digit Span

57

Mean of Group
(SD) a
0.3439 (1.00)

WAIS: Arithmetic

58

0.1047 (1.00)

28

0.4157 (0.92) 30

-0.1857 (1.00)

2.38

0.02*

WAIS: Number/Letter

58

0.4336 (0.98)

28

0.6875 (0.85) 30

0.1967 (1.04)

1.96

0.06

VISUOSPATIAL

59

-1.4468 (3.71)

28

-0.4304 (1.33) 31

-2.3648 (4.81)

2.06

0.04*

Rey

59

-1.4468 (3.71)

28

-0.4304 (1.33) 31

-2.3648 (4.81)

2.06

0.04*

VERBAL MEMORY

59

-0.2544 (1.17)

28

0.0132 (1.23) 31

-0.4961 (1.07)

1.70

0.09

Buschke Total Recall

59

-0.2544 (1.17)

28

0.0132 (1.23) 31

-0.4961 (1.07)

1.70

0.09

Buschke Long Term
Retrieval
Buschke Long Term
Storage
Buschke Consistent Long
Term Retrieval
VISUAL MEMORY

59

-0.2497 (1.12)

28

0.1025 (1.17) 31

-0.5677 (0.98)

2.34

0.02*

59

-0.2049 (1.07)

28

0.1350 (1.12) 31

-0.5119 (0.95)

2.40

0.02*

59

-0.3398 (1.17)

28

-0.0104 (1.24) 31

-0.6374 (1.04)

2.11

0.04*

59

0.2015 (0.91)

28

0.5329 (0.76) 31

-0.0977 (0.94)

Benton Visual Retention:
# Correct
Benton Visual Retention:
# Errors

59

0.3585 (0.85)

28

0.6304 (0.78) 31

0.1129 (0.86)

2.42

0.02*

59

0.0446 (1.01)

28

0.4354 (0.79) 31

-0.3084 (1.07)

3.01

0.004*

0.01*
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a

All values are in z-score units. Z-scores were calculated for each participant’s scores by comparing her performance with standardized, age-corrected norms for
each test.
*
p<0.05
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Table 7
Means and standard deviations of baseline neuropsychological measures, grouped by cognitive domain and psychiatric diagnosis status
at Time 3
Mean of
N DXy Mean (SD)a
N
DXn Mean (SD)a
t-value
p-value
N
a
Group (SD)
MOTOR
51
0.6274 (0.99)
26
0.4774 (1.17)
25
0.7833 (0.77)
-1.10
0.28
Finger Tapper-Dom

50

1.7586 (1.30)

26

1.5469 (1.51)

24

1.99 (0.99)

-1.21

0.23

50

1.4524 (1.28)

26

1.1608(1.40)

24

1.77 (1.06)

-1.72

0.09

50

-0.2084 (1.53)

26

-0.2715 (1.49)

24

-0.1400 (1.61)

-0.30

0.76

Hand
Finger Tapper-Non
Dom Hand
Pegboard- Dom Hand
Pegboard- Non Dom
Hand
LANGUAGE

50

-0.5448 (1.45)

26

-0.5265 (1.50)

24

-0.5646 (1.42)

0.09

0.93

52

0.1888 (1.19)

27

0.2991(1.03)

25

0.0698(1.34)

0.69

0.49

COWAT

52

0.6315 (1.05)

27

-0.5278 (0.85)

25

0.7436 (1.23)

-0.74

0.46

Boston Naming Test

51

-0.2782 (1.78)

26

0.0350 (1.77)

25

-0.6040 (1.77)

1.29

0.20

ATTENTION

52

0.4880 (0.62)

27

0.5711 (0.54)

25

0.3983 (0.70)

1.00

0.32

Trail Making A

52

0.4994 (0.89)

27

0.4389 (0.91)

25

0.5648 (0.89)

-0.50

0.62
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N

N

DXy Mean (SD)a

N

DXn Mean (SD)a

t-value

p-value

27

0.6237 (0.85)

25

0.5344 (0.75)

0.40

0.69

Trail Making B

52

Mean of
Group (SD) a
0.5808 (0.80)

WAIS: Digit Symbol

52

0.6798 (0.99)

27

0.6763 (0.74)

25

0.6836 (1.21)

-0.03

0.98

WAIS: Digit Span

50

0.4324 ( 0.83)

26

0.5627 (0.69)

24

0.2912 (0.95)

1.16

0.25

WAIS: Arithmetic

51

1.9080 (12.33)

27

0.4533 (0.80)

24

3.5446 (18.02)

-0.89

0.38

WAIS: Number/Letter

52

0.4954 ( 0.94)

27

0.6630 (0.79)

25

0.3144 (1.06)

1.35

0.18

VISUOSPATIAL

51

-0.4708 (1.17)

26

-0.2904 (1.09)

25

-0.6584 (1.24)

1.13

0.27

Rey

51

-0.4708 (1.17)

26

-0.2904 (1.09)

25

-0.6584 (1.24)

1.13

0.27

VERBAL MEMORY

52

0.1304 (1.09)

27

0.3496 (0.88)

25

-0.1064 (1.24)

1.53

0.13

Buschke Total Recall

52

0.0996 (1.06)

27

0.4107 (0.83)

25

-0.2364 (1.18)

2.30

0.03*

Buschke Long Term
Retrieval
Buschke Long Term
Storage
Buschke Consistent
Long Term Retrieval
VISUAL MEMORY

52

-0.0148 (1.06)

27

0.1248 (1.00)

25

-0.1656 (1.13)

0.98

0.33

52

0.0287 (1.01)

27

0.1367 (0.96)

25

-0.0880 (1.08)

0.80

0.43

52

-0.1048 (1.16)

27

0.0700 (1.11)

25

-0.2936 (1.21)

1.13

0.26

51

0.0660 (1.08)

27

0.2354 (0.91)

24

-0.1246 (1.23)

1.20

0.24
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Benton Visual
Retention: # Correct
Benton Visual
Retention: # Errors
a

51

0.2476 (1.02)

27

0.3744 (0.88)

24

0.1050 (1.16)

0.94

0.35

51

-0.1157 (1.19)

27

0.0963 (1.00)

24

-0.3542 (1.35)

0.93

0.18

All values are in z-score units. Z-scores were calculated for each participant’s scores by comparing her performance with standardized, age-corrected norms for
each test.
*
p<0.05
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Table 8
Chi-square analysis of self-report of depression and anxiety by impairment status at Time 1.

IMP
*

p<0.05

yes
no

DEP
yes
2
15

X2
no
15
29

0.034*

ANX
yes
3
9

X2
no
14
35

0.14
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Table 9
Chi-square analysis of self-report of depression and anxiety by impairment status at Time 2.

IMP
*

p<0.05

yes
no

DEP
yes
5
10

X2
no
9
34

0.53

ANX
yes
6
13

X2
no
8
31

0.55
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Table 10
Chi-square analysis of self-report of depression and anxiety by impairment status at Time 3.

IMP
*

p<0.05

yes
no

DEP
yes
3
10

X2
no
9
26

0.24

ANX
yes
5
14

X2
no
7
22

0.24
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